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Precautionary Policing and Dispositives of Risk in a Police Force Control Room in 
Domestic Abuse Incidents: An Ethnography of Call Handlers, Dispatchers and 
Response Officers 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the riskwork engaged in by call handlers, dispatchers and response 
officers in a police force control room in England. We present a novel approach by drawing 
on the work of Foucault and his concept le dispositif to study riskwork in policing in a post-
austerity landscape and to develop the analytical concept of ‘precautionary policing’. 
Dispositional analysis allows us to focus on social dispositions or inclinations and to 
demonstrate how these arrangements affect social interaction and organizational behaviour. 
We draw on data collected via ethnographic fieldwork focusing on domestic abuse incidents 
in a police force control room in England. The findings focus on: 1) organizational 
technologies of risk, which guided and surfaced staff actions and decision-making; 2) 
riskwork to mitigate and manage threats and harm to victims and the public; and 3) riskwork 
relating to the professional decision-making of individual staff and officers. In addition to 
bringing the risk tools and artefacts ‘into being’ through their (inter-)actions, for staff, these 
technologies are a safety net to justify practices. They erode opportunities for officer 
discretion, particularly in relation to responses to domestic incidents. Therefore, despite 
policy discussions of the need to reduce officers’ risk aversion and reduce unnecessary 
bureaucracy, a risk averse culture still pervades. Uncertainty becomes a justification for pre-
emptive action by officers and staff before risks become known, and demonstrates a shift to 
precautionary policing practices which do not follow the blueprints of risk management. 
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Introduction 
This article explores the construction of everyday risks by police officers and staff in a police 
force control room (FCR) in England. By drawing on Foucault’s concept of le dispositif 
(dispositive) we argue that police officer and staff negotiations with risk demonstrate a shift 
to what we term ‘precautionary policing’. Foucault’s notion of le dispositif has been widely 
discussed in the social sciences (Agamben 2009, Deleuze 1992), in international relations and 
governmentality (Aradau & Van Munster 2007, Collier 2009), science and technology studies 
(Callon & Muniesa 2003), discourse theory and analysis (Jäger 2001), and studies of 
management and organizations (Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer & Thaning 2016). However, it 
has not yet been utilised by social scientists analysing policing and police occupational 
cultures. We offer the first application of Foucault’s le dispositif to understand riskwork and 
precaution in policing, centring on the operations of a force control room in England focusing 
primarily on domestic abuse incidents. In doing so we develop the analytical concept of 
‘precautionary policing’ to discuss emerging police strategies for managing and mitigating 
risk/s in a post-austerity landscape. Aggeri defines dispositif as: ‘the arrangement of 
heterogeneous material, cognitive and discursive elements designed to frame the behaviour of 
governed subjects and to guide it towards specific goals.’ (2017, p. 42). The elements that 
compose dispositif include ‘the said and the unsaid … discursive and socio-material elements 
… the speakable and the visible’ (p. 40). Adopting a Foucauldian approach to understand risk 
allows us to focus on how risks are governed rather than whether they are calculable or 
incalculable. 
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Risk management is viewed as a backbone of good governance in both the public and private 
sectors and as a cornerstone of modern management control (Huber & Scheytt 2013). Within 
policing, risk management has been identified as a driving feature of crime control. Since the 
early 1990s, policing has taken a future oriented and pro-active approach to identifying, 
analysing and managing risks, driven in part by dissatisfaction with traditional reactive 
policing and a policy landscape of value for money (Maguire 2000). However, in operational 
policing the volume of apparent risk is high and it can be difficult for officers to identify 
those situations which require intervention (Heaton, Bryant & Tong 2018). This means that 
‘retrospective judgements about the selection and adequacy of interventions are likely to be 
affected by the nature of the outcomes of events’ (Heaton, Bryant & Tong 2018, p. 11). The 
police approach to ‘risk business’ (i.e. missing persons, child protection and domestic 
violence) has also been influenced by the desire to avoid public criticism in response to high-
profile incidents (Heaton 2009). 
 
We draw on data collected via ethnographic fieldwork in a police force control room (FCR) 
in England to highlight how officers and staff construct narratives of risk and how these 
narratives shape and guide organizational behaviour(s) and decision-making. We argue that 
in addition to bringing risk tools and artefacts ‘into being’ through their (inter-)actions, for 
staff, these technologies of control are a safety net to justify practices in a post-austerity 
policing landscape. These narratives of risk highlight the erosion of opportunities for officer 
discretion, particularly in relation to their responses to domestic incidents. Despite policy 
discussions of the need to reduce officers’ risk aversion and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy 
(Flanagan 2008), risk aversion still permeates police culture. Moreover, a ‘protectionist 
agenda’ in policing means that uncertainty becomes a justification for pre-emptive action by 
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officers and staff before risks become known (Heaton, Bryant & Tong, 2018). This reflects a 
shift in policing to precautionary approaches which do not necessarily follow the intended 
blueprints of risk management (Ransley & Mazerolle 2009). Therefore, inaction is seen as 
indefensible, even when the potential threat or consequence to victims or members of the 
public is unknown (Campbell 2004). We focus on risks most present for staff working in a 
FCR and officers on response. Domestic abuse incidents were our primary focus and were a 
central feature of the work we observed, though other risks, particularly around vulnerability 
soon became apparent. We acknowledge these risks may be different in other FCRs 
dependent on their organizational service failures and the ‘cautionary tales’ which influence 
officer and staff decision-making.  
 
The structure of the article is as follows: First, we outline the current context for policing in 
England and Wales and the function of the police force control room (FCR). We then review 
literature on risk in policing and criminal justice and the precautionary principle. We present 
the theoretical and analytical framework which draws on Foucault’s ‘governmentality thesis’ 
and his concept le dispositif. This allows us to analyse the police response to victims of crime 
(particularly for critical incidents) and the turn to what we have called ‘precautionary 
policing’. After providing an overview of the methods utilised, we present findings which 
focus on: 1. organizational ‘technologies’ of risk, which both guided and surfaced staff 
actions and decisions; 2. riskwork to mitigate and manage risk to victims and the public; and 
3. riskwork relating to the professional decision-making of staff. 
 
Risk, austerity and the police force control room 
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The police FCR is an aspect of police occupational culture which has been relatively 
understudied by sociologists and criminologists, with the exception of the work of Manning 
(1988), Waddington (1993) and more recently Stafford (2016) and also work by conversation 
analysts. This is despite the role that call handlers and dispatch officers play in defining 
incidents, drawing boundaries concerning what constitutes police work, and what can/will be 
responded to by the police in a post-austerity context of increased demand, reduced 
resources, and the civilianisation of various traditional police roles (Lumsden & Black 2018). 
The FCR is a function performed mainly by staff. In England and Wales in 2009 13 forces 
had more than 90 per cent of their FCRs staffed by civilians, with a force average of 85 per 
cent (Boyd, Geoghegan & Gibbs 2011). Call handlers are the first line in the investigation 
process (HMIC 2017). They identify where evidence needs to be preserved, issues of 
vulnerability and safeguarding, and the priority level that calls needs to be ascribed. Given 
the increase in the number of calls and the decrease in resources, call handlers are not always 
given the appropriate guidance and are increasingly dealing with calls over the phone rather 
than sending a response officer. There are no national targets for police response times to 
emergency and non-emergency calls. However, of the 38 forces that have set a local target, 
over half are failing to meet that target (HMIC 2014a). This is against a backdrop of austerity 
cuts implemented to policing in England and Wales since 2008. 
 
In 2017 HMIC raised a ‘deep-red warning flag’ after identifying practices of deliberately 
suppressing demand, not responding to crimes, and not making arrests due to a lack of 
resources. In his Review of Policing, Flanagan (2008, p. 7) raised concerns regarding the need 
to reduce officers’ risk aversion and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy: ‘this means that better 
understanding of risks to the public is matched by a better understanding of the dangers of 
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risk aversion, within the service and in wider society.’ The 2009 Reducing Bureaucracy in 
Policing report called for standards, policy and training to take a ‘balanced view of risks’ in 
order to reduce the blame culture which officers viewed as leading to risk averse policing 
(Heaton 2010). The College of Policing has created various operational policing guidance. 
For example, its Authorised Professional Practice (2013) guidelines contain 10 principles 
related to risk. These are designed to encourage the police service to adopt ‘a more positive 
approach to risk by openly supporting decision makers and building their confidence in 
taking risks.’ However, Heaton (2010) argues that the sheer volume of guidelines and 
difficulty implementing them in daily practice results in officers becoming more risk averse. 
 
In the last decade there has been a shift in policing priorities ‘from crime fighting to public 
protection of ever-widening scope’ (Heaton, Bryant & Tong 2018, p. 2). Acting to prevent 
harm has become a central focus for police officers, who frequently deal with ‘low-
probability, high-impact risk’ (p. 2). In the UK, a rising protection agenda with a focus on 
vulnerable adults and children coincided with a series of critical public enquiries, such as the 
Laming Report into the death of Victoria Climbie1 and the Bichard Inquiry into the Soham 
child murders.2 The result of this has been an increasing level of public intolerance for 
service failure, damage to police force reputations, and individual officers being held 
accountable for misconduct. The hindsight of inspections and audits means that negative 
outcomes are ‘far more foreseeable after an event than they were beforehand’ (p. 2). We see a 
shift in official discourses towards encouraging officers to be more confident in their 
decision-making. However, as we will demonstrate herein, this has not filtered through to 
frontline policing, and risk processes and officer discretion often conflict. 
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Literature: risk, the precautionary principle and policing 
Risk in policing and criminal justice 
The management of risk is a central component of criminal justice while protecting the public 
has become the dominant theme of penal policy (Garland 2001). Discussions of risk within 
criminology and criminal justice literature have primarily drawn on Beck’s (1992) ‘risk 
society’ and Foucault’s (1997) ‘governmentality thesis’. The central tenant of the ‘risk 
society’ thesis is that governments in late modern society were shaped by an awareness of the 
risks that these times generated. These risks were to be managed by the collection and 
generation of expert knowledge that could predict and mitigate these risks but which 
paradoxically created new fears about new risks and highlighted the limitations of our expert 
knowledge. 
 
From a Foucauldian governmentality perspective, risk takes on a less totalising and realist 
perspective and offers a social constructionist account of risk ‘in process’ and ‘ever 
becoming’ (O'Malley 1999). Risk is the means through which populations are regulated, 
disciplined and managed utilising actuarial techniques of information gathering and probable 
future prediction. State power operates through the segmenting and ordering of social life, 
classifying groups based on statistical knowledge of risk (Mythen & Walklate 2006). Within 
criminal justice and penal policy this probability is most clearly developed as a form of 
actuarial justice, theorised by Feeley and Simon (1992) as the ‘new penology’ in which the 
riskiness of offenders has overshadowed the search for moral culpability. Risk is no longer 
managed at the social level but rather at the individual level (Mythen & Walklate 2006).  
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In Policing the Risk Society, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) link the social changes identified 
by Beck’s ‘risk society’ and Foucault's ‘governmentality thesis’ to analyse the workings of 
institutional governance. They argue that police work is organized around risk management 
and the prioritising of future predictions in a society consumed by insecurity and fear. Police 
officers become risk professionals who generate forms of risk communications about security 
which they then share and exchange with risk professionals from external institutions. They 
become knowledge workers, satiating demand for knowledge about risks whilst bringing 
‘into being’ those risks identified in the future. Ericson and Haggerty challenge previous 
understandings which viewed police work as driven by the police culture of discretion, 
action-focused, and non-reflexive, in which information gathering, risk communications and 
technologies (the ‘paper burden’) do not shape police operations but ultimately come to 
support an officer's retrospective accounts and actions (Manning 1988). They assert that 
police work has become organized by classifications of risk and by the technologies that 
gather risk knowledge. These technologies force specifically rigid collections of expert risk 
knowledge which allows for rapid assessment and response of resources in the ‘perpetual 
quest for certainty’ (Ericson & Haggerty 1997, p. 34). 
 
Subsequent work on policing, security and risk makes reference to Policing the Risk Society. 
Mythen and Walklate (2006) explore the relevance of theories of risk to understandings of 
‘new terrorism’. Campbell (2004) analyses Ericson and Haggerty's idea of risk 
communications and the reduction in police narratives in decision-making. Ferret and 
Spenlehauer (2008) consider whether the thesis can be applied to risk management practices 
within Road Traffic Policing. The latter conclude that Policing the Risk Society may have 
produced an ideal type of risk governance, rather than an actually existing reality, something 
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that Foucault notes in Discipline and Punish in relation to the panoptic prisons of disciplinary 
power. As O'Malley (2015) states: ‘In practice all manner of unforeseen conditions will come 
between the diagrams or blueprints of government and their realisation’ (p. 429). 
 
The precautionary principle 
As the ‘risk society’ thesis developed during the 1990s and 2000s, certain events, for 
example the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, and the global recession of 2008, challenged 
our reliance on risk management tools and attempts at scientific predictions about the future. 
The ‘precautionary principle’, especially in matters of security, began to take precedence 
over discourses of knowable risk. ‘Precautionary risk’ urges us to take action on the basis of 
potential ‘“unmanageable risks”, even after tests have been conducted that find no evidence 
of harm’ (Aradau & Van Munster 2007, p. 102). Therefore, to be responsible means engaging 
in prevention ‘at all costs’ and appreciating ‘that the future cost of harm is immeasurable’ 
(Ericson & Doyle 2004, p. 147). 
 
The precautionary principle has its roots in the German Vorsorgeprinzip, which emerged in 
the 1970s and developed into a principle of German environmental law (Ewald 2002). In the 
realm of insurance, the precautionary dispositif ‘inscribes upon the existing technologies of 
insurance other forms of calculation and relationality to the future’ (Aradau & Van Munster 
2007, p. 101). Precautionary risk is based on four interlinked rationalities that allow for the 
deployment of specific technologies of government. These include: ‘zero risk, worst case 
scenario, shifting the burden of proof and serious and irreversible damage’ (Aradau & Van 
Munster 2007, p. 103). However, the essence of the precautionary principle is that any level 
of risk is unacceptable, and because risk assessment will only take you so far, at some point 
This is a pre-print version of: Black, A. and Lumsden, K. (2019) ‘Precautionary Policing and 
Dispositives of Risk in a Police Force Control Room in Domestic Abuse Incidents: An 
Ethnography of Call Handlers, Dispatchers and Response Officers.’ Policing & Society. 
Online first. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2019.1568428  
	
	 10 
you have to start thinking about ‘worst case scenarios’. Policies based on uncertainty view 
knowledge as unreliable therefore moving away from evidence-based policy to ‘worst case 
scenarios’ and ‘what if?’ questions (Crawford 2004; Ransley & Mazerolle 2009). 
Uncertainty becomes a justification for pre-emptive action before risks even become known. 
 
Within policing, the academic literature on the precautionary principle has mostly been 
considered in relation to security and terrorism (Walker 2008; Lennon 2016) and to the 
management of dangerous offenders (Hebenton & Seddon 2009). The use of ‘suspicionless 
searches’ under Counter Terrorism legislation, allowing for people to be stopped and 
searched before any risk has materialised, is an example of precautionary policing at the 
street level (Lennon 2016). It is characteristic of what Walker (2008) terms ‘all-risks 
policing’ in which intelligence-driven approaches no longer offer the confidence to discern 
‘foe from friend’ under the threat of terrorism. Within ‘all risks policing’ everyone can be an 
object of risk or riskiness, not necessarily because of the individual, but because of ‘the 
nature of the threat and the vulnerability or importance of a particular target’ (p. 277). It is 
important here to also note the distinction between the terms prevention and precaution 
within policing. As Ewald (2002) makes clear, prevention has roots firmly in risk discourse, 
wherein knowledge over risks is assumed and developed. In contrast, the precautionary logic 
applies to those potential consequences which are inherently uncertain and unknowable.     
 
Foucault: le dispositif 
We draw on Foucault’s governmentality approach to the study of risk and his concept le 
dispositif (Foucault 2004a, 2004b, 2007, 2008). It forms a crucial constituent of societal 
analysis in Foucault’s work which is ‘on par with the more familiar analytics of discourse, 
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discipline, power/knowledge, subjectivity, and subjectification’ (Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer 
& Thaning 2016, p. 274). Dispositif is able to cut across and connect categories ‘such as 
institutions, classes, and cultures together with ideas, ideologies, and beliefs’ (Raffnsøe, 
Gudmand-Høyer & Thaning 2016, p. 273). The term is useful here as it carries with it the 
connotations of ‘something that disposes or inclines’, or ‘has the quality of disposing or 
inclining’ (Oxford English Dictionary (OED), s.v., cited Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer & 
Thaning 2016, p. 275). 
 
As Salter (2008) clarifies: ‘Foucault’s sense of dispositif is not mechanistic as a structure, an 
apparatus, or a network per se, but rather a constellation of institutions, practices, and beliefs 
that create the conditions of possibility within a particular field. It is a capability for 
governance, or the disposition of a field towards a mode of governance’ (p. 248). Examples 
of dispositif which Foucault discusses include legal, disciplinary and the security dispositif. 
The various elements that make up a dispositif can be understood as rationalities and 
technologies of government (Aradau & Van Munster 2007). Dispositifs are contained within 
rationalization processes and in historically situated systems of thought and strategies (Aggeri 
2017). Dispositif is of a relational nature (Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer & Thaning 2016). It 
allows us to take account of external influences on an organization (and vice-versa), and the 
relationship between the individual and the organization (Välikangas & Seeck 2011). 
Dispositif is also a valuable analytical tool in that it permits us to account for the unintended 
consequences arising from a dispositif.  
 
Foucault’s dispositif has been applied in international relations and governmentality, 
insurance and finance, science and technology studies, discourse theory and analysis, and 
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studies of management and organizations (Agamben 2009, Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 
Deleuze 1992, Collier 2009, Jäger 2001). However, it has not yet been utilised to analyse 
policing. Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer and Thaning (2016) develop Foucault’s dispositional 
analytics as an overarching analytical framework for organization studies. Huber and Scheytt 
(2013) focus on the expansion of risk management after the 2008 global recession and why it 
continued despite its failure to manage risks during the crisis. They argue that a dispositif of 
risk management, ‘an assemblage of institutions, regulations and models, lies at the heart of 
risk management’ (p. 88). Aggeri (2017) outlines the value of dispositif and governmentality 
for the study of performativity in organizations. He demonstrates how various management 
tools and instruments ‘in action build practices and even impose their own logic on those who 
make use of them…’ (2017, p. 39). Aradau and Van Munster (2007) employ the concept of 
dispositif to explore precautionary risk and risk analysis as conceptual tools that shed light on 
the practices defined under the ‘war on terror’. Here, risk is a dispositif for governing social 
problems and ‘creates a specific relation to the future, which requires the monitoring of the 
future, the attempt to calculate what the future can offer and the necessity to control and 
minimize its potentially harmful effects’ (p. 98). This links everyday risks like crime, and 
catastrophic and extraordinary risks, like terror. 
 
Therefore, a Foucauldian approach and le dispositif permit us to focus on ‘how’ everyday 
risks are governed in policing, rather than whether they are calculable or incalculable. It also 
operationalizes risk as a mode of regulation, through which populations are surveyed 
(Mythen & Walklate 2006) and enables us to understand precautionary risk as a dispositif 
that attempts to govern what appears to be ungovernable. When ‘technologies of knowledge 
reach their limit, precautionary risk relies on decision as a technology for governing 
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uncertainty’ (Aradau & Van Munster 2007, p. 107). We can see this reliance on decision as a 
technology for governing uncertainty in policing, and we will explore this further below. 
Thus the dispositif as an analytical tool allows us to consider how in the governance of risk or 
security there is the disposition towards particular ‘forces, resources, and norms’ (Salter 
2008, p. 262).      
 
One of these norms is the form of ‘riskwork’ that staff and officers engage in. According to 
Power (2016) ‘riskwork’ is the work which goes in to risk management and the ‘actions and 
routines through which organizational actors make sense of risk, of themselves and their 
roles, and collectively try to enact institutional scripts’ (2016, p.8). Risk is thus an 
organizational practice (Power 2016). At an institutional level, risks are uncertainties which 
have been identified as objects of management (Power 2007). Once an uncertain event 
becomes a risk, it is placed within a system of expectation, attributing responsibility and 
opening it up to an audit processes. However, just because a risk is placed within the 
management process it does not directly follow that the risk can be managed, only that 
organisations must ‘act as if the management of risk is possible’ (Power 2007, p. 6). This 
organizational processing also includes consideration of the individual actors who engage in 
the everyday managing of risks, which is a key focus of this paper.  
 
Methods 
The discussion draws on findings from an ethnographic study of a police force control room 
in England. The study was more broadly concerned with the police response to domestic 
violence calls at the frontline, which included call handling, dispatch and response officers 
(see Lumsden & Black 2018). Domestic abuse calls were the initial primary focus of the 
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observation, particularly regarding definitions, resourcing, and management of risk. 
However, during the observations other frequent calls and practices were observed which 
were of significance to the general functioning of the control room. As Hughes states, the 
purpose of ethnography is to obtain a rounded rather than a segmented understanding of the 
field (cited in Boyle 1994). 66 hours of observation were conducted between November 2016 
and February 2017. This involved a combination of day (7) and early evening shifts (6). 
Author 2 conducted 11 hours of observation while Author 1 conducted the majority of the 
observations totalling 55 hours. Ethnography allows for detailed investigation of human 
behaviour and the factors that influence such behaviour. We participated in the setting by 
listening to the calls and observing call handler and dispatch behaviours. As part of this study 
we also conducted four focus groups with frontline officers (26 officers in total) in order to 
explore their response to domestic violence calls, and the relationship and interactions 
between dispatchers in the FCR and frontline officers on response; however, we do not draw 
on this data herein. 
 
Access to the FCR was granted via the manager who acted as gatekeeper and made decisions 
as to which individuals or teams we would sit with. The authors acknowledge that the 
decisions of the gatekeeper as to who would be observed may have been shaped by the overt 
nature of the research and the potential reactions of the staff (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). 
We were placed with staff who were most willing and open to observation and discussion and 
this could demonstrate the gatekeeper managing the research field. We were given a head-set 
in order to listen to the call handlers and the dispatchers’ conversations with response officers 
and other parties. There were no great differences in terms of the gender composition of FCR 
workers, however during some shifts it was observed that there were more female call 
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handlers on the non-emergency and emergency call function. The majority of call handlers 
and dispatchers we sat with were civilian staff, although police officers were also present in 
the roles of supervisors, intelligence officers, and demand management teams (i.e. resolving 
crimes via telephone calls rather than face-to-face visits). The civilian staff identified 
themselves as the frontline and exhibited many of the cultural practices of rank and file 
officers. They wore uniforms, worked shift patterns, and engaged with members of the public 
and police officers in a variety of emotionally demanding situations. Several of the staff were 
special constables while others were applying to become police officers or had been so in the 
past. In this sense, there was not a clear division between staff and officers. The below 
excerpt describes the spatial organization of the FCR: 
 
The FCR spreads across two main rooms, with smaller offices coming off them. The 
two rooms house the call handlers and the dispatch room which are separated by a 
few steps up and a door. The dispatch room is up the stairs. In the dispatch room there 
are three main banks of desks with a raised platform containing two additional desks 
looking over the room. These two desks seat the ‘Oscars’, the inspectors who have 
responsibility of the room. The two outermost banks of desks cover the five divisional 
policing areas … with either one or two dispatchers per geography. If there are two, 
one person tends to be the lead and the other acts as a support; writing up logs of 
action, making calls, looking up intelligence etc. It also includes one dispatcher 
dedicated to roads policing and one dedicated intelligence officer. The middle bank of 
desks included the shift leader for the dispatch and other staff/officers who have a 
more victim-centred job; making calls, keeping people informed, looking up 
information. (Field notes, 18 November 2016) 
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Short-hand notes of observations and conversations with staff were made in the FCR, either 
in a notebook or in a mobile phone notes function. This helped to highlight items that we did 
not want to forget without being intrusive. Field notes were then written up after each 
observation and described the setting, calls, conversations and incidents. We adopted an 
inductive approach to analysis and entered into a simultaneous process of deduction and 
induction, drawing on Braun and Clarke’s (2006) steps for thematic analysis. Theory was 
developed out of data analysis, and subsequent data collection was guided by the emergent 
theory. The study received ethical clearance from the university and followed the ethical 
guidelines of the British Sociological Association (2002). Pseudonyms are used to disguise 
the identities of police officers, staff and callers. The police force and geographical areas 
have also been anonymised and any identifying factors omitted from field notes so that they 
do not result in the identification of the force or employees. 
 
Findings: a dispositif of risk in policing 
1. Organizational technologies of risk 
There were several risk management tools and technologies that officers and staff in the FCR 
interacted with throughout the shift. One of the most significant tools which call handlers and 
officers use to inform decision-making when taking a call is the THRIVE methodology 
(threat, harm, risk, investigation, vulnerable and engagement). The ‘threat’, ‘harm’ and ‘risk’ 
approach is a way of ‘allocating policing resources in a way that maximises police 
productivity and performance by focusing on the right things’ while also helping to reduce 
unnecessary bureaucracy and approve accountability (Flanagan 2008, p. 10). Many forces in 
England and Wales now adopt the Threat, Harm, Risk Matrix, or ‘THRIVE model’ to inform 
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their operational decision making.  This formal risk management framework is used by call 
handlers in FCRs to assess the appropriate police response to emergency and non-emergency 
calls. The incident is then graded as: non-attendance (often resolved over the telephone - 
Grade 4), a scheduled appointment (SA) (a defined meeting time in the following days - 
Grade 3), a priority (non-emergency: to attend as soon as available - Grade 2), or immediate 
response (emergency incident - Grade 1) and passed to a dispatcher who identifies and 
deploys the most appropriate and timely resource, and relays background information to the 
response officers. THRIVE sits within the National Decision Making Model (NDM) which 
guides decision-making by all actors within the police (College of Policing 2014). 
 
It is through risk tools such as THRIVE that officers act as the ‘risk experts’ identified by 
Ericson and Haggerty (1997). Call handlers seek information and store this as 
‘communications’ which shape how and when they respond, based on the risks identified via 
THRIVE. These risk tools operate as ‘risk artefacts’ which are tangible representations of 
risk (Power 2016). They are a product of expertise and knowledge used to guide decision-
making in close proximity to decision-makers. They can also often be used to audit 
performance ‘at a distance’ from decision-makers. However, in the FCR we observed, pre-
emptive and precautionary policies had been put in place which subverted the risk 
management process, challenging officers’ status as risk experts. One example of this is their 
domestic abuse policy which required call takers to grade all calls that were domestic related 
incidents as either an immediate response (grade 1) or a priority (grade 2). This domestic 
abuse policy supplanted the immediate need for call handlers to make decisions based on 
THRIVE. Staff in the FCR saw this as a precautionary policy to protect victims, but also to 
protect the force: 
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I asked Matt how domestic violence incidents were graded. He informed me that all 
DA’s [domestic abuse incidents] were graded as either an emergency or as a prompt. 
A prompt means that an officer will be out as soon as possible, but it is not their 
immediate priority. The implication being that as soon as there are no emergency 
graded incidents, the officer will attend. It should be at some point within that shift. In 
reality, these prompts often keep getting pushed back as emergencies take priority. I 
was informed that often these DA incidents do not require a grade 1 or 2 (emergency 
and prompt) and that an equivalent incident that was not DA related would usually be 
given a 3 or 4 (Scheduled visit or no attendance - usually dealt with over the phone). I 
asked why they were automatically graded 1 and 2 and … he said it was, ‘in the 
interest of the victim, but also ourselves’. The notion of possible litigation hovered 
over the description he gave. (Field notes, 18 November 2016) 
 
As can be seen in the above excerpt, the domestic abuse policy operates at a level beyond the 
THRIVE risk assessment and at times in opposition to THRIVE. Incidents which would in 
other contexts be responded to as a scheduled appointment or not resourced at all were 
automatically resourced when domestic-related, negating the need for expert risk decisions at 
this level. This represents a shift from managing probabilistic outcomes based on THRIVE to 
possibilistic ‘worst case scenario’ outcomes. The reason for such specific policy action is 
related to the history of policing domestic abuse and the significant managerial and auditing 
processes that monitor responses to domestic abuse at a local and also a national level. 
Previous studies have highlighted rigid frontline police processes which create a culture of 
risk aversion and disproportionate precautionary responses from officers to victims of 
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domestic abuse (Robinson et al. 2016). What we see here is that this precautionary response 
is established at the call handler level, further shaping the police officer’s response to the 
victim.  
 
What begins to emerge is a prevailing view that responding to these incidents is often at 
times unnecessary, goes against staff and officers’ own professional judgement, and also 
drains dispatch staff as they attempt to resource a high volume of domestic-related incidents 
with frontline resources that are already under strain: 
 
A call had come in to the 9993 call taker of a parent who was reporting that their child 
had stolen their electronic tablet. This story was being told to me by the dispatchers as 
it was an incident in their queue. As the call was being made the call taker had 
overheard arguments in the background. So because it was an argument it was dealt 
with as a domestic rather than a theft. This caused some eye rolling … They went on 
to say that most calls come in from neighbours as they overhear arguing and report a 
domestic. The suggestion was that this was over the top and unnecessary … As the 
dispatcher was updating the logs on the tablet theft I asked what was happening. She 
said that the tablet had been returned but that in the furore the father had been pushed 
so there was a disclosure of physical assault. But because the tablet had been returned 
the father didn’t want to take it any further. But because it had been classed as a 
domestic it was on the system as a grade 2. The dispatchers comment about this was 
that the IP [Injured party] was not going to cooperate, but because it was in the system 
the police would need to attend, they would have to keep calling and sending letters. 
She described a long list of things they would have to spend time doing as though it 
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was a drain on the resources. She said it would go on for about 3 weeks trying to 
pursue this domestic and that nothing would come from it. She seemed very annoyed 
by this. She was somewhat exasperated by the idea that they would have to chase this 
up for the next few weeks even though she already knew what the outcome would be. 
(Field notes, 24 November 2016) 
 
Dispatch officers found it frustrating that domestic incidents would appear in the resourcing 
queue for longer than ‘non-domestic’ grade 2 incidents. As noted above, one main reason for 
this was that they were often judged as lower risk than other grade 2 incidents (i.e. grade 3 or 
4) and so would be de-prioritised and pushed down the queue as other incidents came in. This 
effectively created a separate sub-set of grade 2 incidents which were treated within a slightly 
different timeframe but nonetheless resourced partly due to fear of inaction (Heaton, Bryant 
& Tong 2018).  
 
Another reason for this frustration was that victims did not always want to engage with 
officers, but officers had to attend as per the domestic abuse policy: 
 
I asked about the domestic jobs. One had been in the queue since the 2nd December 
(it was now the 6th) and two had been there since the 4th. One had come in that day. 
Andy said that the four that had been waiting were cases of the victim not wanting to 
engage with the police. He went down the list saying things like, ‘She (pointing to an 
incident) doesn’t want to see us so that’s going to be difficult, and that (pointing to 
another one) is going to be a nightmare’. He went through the notes showing me the 
actions that had been taken. Calls had been made to the IP but she didn’t want to 
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speak. The police had been to the house of two of the IPs but they didn’t answer. One 
of the IPs had no fixed address and so they struggled to find her. They managed to 
speak with her on the phone and she said she would come to the station at a specific 
time but did not then attend … He lamented the fact that they were sat in the queue 
unable to be resolved. (Field notes, 6 December 2016) 
 
Here, we see the ‘riskwork’ that goes into managing domestic-related incidents which sit 
outside of the formal risk management process. The relationship that emerges between 
individual staff and the risk management tool highlights the impact of wider organizational 
requirements within a precautionary dispositif. The unintended outcome of the dispositif on 
those staff members is more management of risk, rather than less. 
 
The domestic abuse policy intends to ‘design out’ any chance of risk rather than allowing risk 
assessments to be made or, ‘the willingness to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty’, 
as per the College of Policing's principles of risk. Response officers are expected to attend 
incidents, decisions which may sometimes be at odds with the victims’ wishes, and which 
can cause frustration at the dispatch level and the response officer level. It also brings ‘into 
being’ other forms of risk knowledge. Response officers who attend domestic incidents are 
expected to complete a domestic abuse risk assessment using a DASH (Domestic Abuse, 
Stalking and Harassment) form which comprises a series of risk questions. This risk 
assessment has been designed with the intention of improving officer interactions with 
domestic abuse victims and identifying the signs of potential future risk (Robinson et al. 
2016). However, the usefulness of this tool as a 'risk artefact' (Power 2016) is challenged 
when officers do not value the need for it: 
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As we were talking a grade 1 domestic came in. A female was reporting her ex-
partner banging on her door. As Andy was trying to get someone who could respond 
(all of the officers were engaged) the incident was downgraded to a prompt as the ex-
had left as the IP was on the phone. The IP believed he was still sat outside in a van. 
However, the IP was a repeat caller and the ex-had priors for violence so officers 
were still deployed. This is what the police reported back: When they got there the ex 
was sat in his car. They went to speak with the IP but she wouldn’t speak to the 
police. The police asked the ex what he was doing and he replied that he came to 
collect his child every day at this time but on this occasion the IP called the police … 
The officers radioed up and said ‘nothing has happened. What are we supposed to 
do?’ The officer asked Andy to call them (point to point which is a direct call to their 
radio so other people can’t hear on the airwave). Andy relayed to me what had been 
said. He stated that the officers were asking what they needed to do now. They were 
saying it was a non-crime, nothing had happened so what should they do if the IP 
won’t speak to them. Andy stated that they would probably still need to do a DASH 
and a safety plan but that he would check with the Oscar. He asked the Oscar what 
they should do and she said they needed to go back and get a DASH. Andy radioed 
the officer in the case and told them they needed to get a DASH. He said to them, ‘I 
appreciate it’s not the best’. He was referring to the having to follow up on this when 
the officers didn’t seem to want to. The officers agreed but were slightly reluctant.  
(Field notes, 6 December 2016) 
 
This is a pre-print version of: Black, A. and Lumsden, K. (2019) ‘Precautionary Policing and 
Dispositives of Risk in a Police Force Control Room in Domestic Abuse Incidents: An 
Ethnography of Call Handlers, Dispatchers and Response Officers.’ Policing & Society. 
Online first. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2019.1568428  
	
	 23 
Officers are engaging with the risk management tools but do not fully accept them as expert 
artefacts. They engage with these risk tools producing risk knowledge, which works against 
their own discretion. For example: 
 
A call came in of a bailiff who had attended a house to reclaim a debt and the home 
owner (who was not there) had called to say he was coming to kill the bailiff. Andy 
contacted the officers to ask if they were free. They said they were on the phone with 
the IP mentioned above filling out a DASH form. They said it in a way that was 
trying to make a point like, ‘no, we are still here doing this DASH!’ So Andy said 
again about domestics taking up necessary resources. He said, ‘so that (the DA) just 
screwed us for this’ (the bailiff). They were unhappy that the few resources available 
were being tied up with domestics. (Field notes, 6 December 2016) 
 
The above example is demonstrative of what we have termed ‘precautionary policing’ within 
the dispositif of risk. Here we see the relational nature of organizational policy, external 
austerity impacts and localised staff beliefs and norms shaping the way in which these 
everyday risks are governed. The policy, which intends to improve officer responses to 
domestic abuse and the culture that surrounds it, serves to undermine its intentions through a 
‘one-size-fits all’ approach. The rigidity of the policy reduces officer and staff decision-
making which reinforces their awareness and practices of risk-aversion. It also confronts an 
austerity environment wherein it increases the number of incidents that need to be resourced, 
which has a further impact on the demand management and time of frontline response 
officers. Therefore, these forms of risk assessment are devalued if officers see them as 
working against their own discretion, rather than complementing it. 
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2. Everyday riskwork with victims and the public 
Above, we have demonstrated how the domestic abuse policy is a form of precautionary 
policing driven by uncertainty and the prospect of a potential bad outcome or ‘worst case 
scenario’. We identified similar forms of precautionary policing, especially with regards to 
vulnerable people or critical incidents that have occurred in the past. A critical incident is 
defined as: ‘any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a 
significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community’ (NPIA 
2011, p. 10). Calls that related to vulnerable victims or previous critical incidents had a 
permeable presence within the FCR. The precautions that followed these incidents were ways 
of reducing the possibility of uncertain outcomes for victims. It is the inability to know which 
incidents may lead to negative outcomes for victims which drives precaution: 
  
As we were talking a call came in from a husband who was reporting his wife was 
missing with their child. He said she was vulnerable and he believed she was in the 
company of a man who was seen as dangerous. There were previous reports 
connected to this female so it was treated as more seriously that it would have 
otherwise. Sarah said they needed to go and see this woman to make sure she was ok. 
It was on the system as a prompt [grade 2] … Sarah said that they would not inform 
the partner of her whereabouts but that they needed to find her and see her anyway. 
Eventually the Sarah made telephone contact with the female. Sarah asked if she was 
safe and well and assured her that she would not inform her ex of her location. The 
female confirmed she had left him and that she was staying with a friend. She told 
Sarah where she would be for officers to go and speak with her. She also confirmed 
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that she was in a new relationship with the other male mentioned … I asked what 
would happen next and she said they would try to send an officer round to the house. 
She said this would be a welfare check as there are no crimes. I asked why they 
needed to physically see her. Sarah mimed a gun to the head and said we always need 
to see people in case they are being threatened on the other end of the phone. ‘We 
don’t know if they have a gun to the head’, she said. She stressed that they need to be 
physically seen by an officer to ensure safety. (Field notes, 1 December 2016) 
 
This speaks to Salters’ (2008) understandings of risk in the security industry which suggests 
that imagination is ‘the primary act of risk’ (p. 248). Imagination constructs ‘what’ is a risk in 
a world were anything can be a risk. Risk management processes are created to tame this 
imagination and make it rational and reasonable. However, within a precautionary (policing) 
risk dispositif officers move away from reliance on having knowledge to shape decisions, to 
acting under a constant banner of uncertainty (Aradau & Van Munster 2007). As noted 
above, a precautionary rationality plans according to ‘worst case scenarios’. Although 
unlikely, there is always a possibility that callers and victims ‘have a gun to the head’. It is 
this ‘imagined’ possibility which shapes the call handler’s response. 
 
Another example of this ‘unlikely but possible’ scenario relates to a precautionary policy of 
managing ‘dropped 999 calls’: when a call is placed to 999 but the caller cannot be 
identified. Often these calls are the result of accidental dialling or children playing on the 
telephone line. All of the dropped 999 calls are classified as a grade 1 emergency and it is the 
responsibility of the FCR supervisor to make contact with the caller to ensure their safety. 
There is the possibility that the caller may have come to harm or is under duress, as has 
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happened in the past. The resulting policy is a precautionary approach which carries with it a 
worst case scenario tension: 
 
…a dropped 999 call came in to the station with shouting in the back ground. As per 
policy, this needed to be resolved. The Oscar took the lead. They conducted a 
subscriber check and there was some confusion between t.mobile and O2 as to who 
owned the phone. Neither could agree if it was their phone.... Next the call records of 
this number were pulled and the last 10 calls were analysed. The Oscar began calling 
the last known numbers and found a person that said they knew the phone holder… 
The police attended this person’s house and got told that the number belonged to a 
person in the top flat. The police went to the top flat and stated that the residents were 
not cooperative… The officers had left the flat when they provided this update. On 
advice of the Oscar, Jill [dispatcher] asked the officers to go back to the flat and push 
a little harder… A little later the Oscar provided another name that might be 
connected to the phone… The officers were on their way to the street as I left at 
10.00pm. This had been going on for approx. 4 hours with no obvious signs of 
ending. (Field notes, 1 December 2016) 
 
The practice of physically seeing a caller or victim was a precautionary response to 
potentially risky calls; risks in terms of harm to victims but also critical incidents (harms to 
public and police). Staff in the FCR would talk of needing to ‘lay eyes’ on potential victims 
or ‘look at them’: 
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There was a DA incident occurring on the desk next to ours. I didn’t get the details 
but the Oscar [supervisor] had come over to speak to the dispatchers. They were 
trying to locate the IP and those involved seemed to be a little frustrated at resolving 
this job. The Oscar stated: ‘We just need to look at them’. (Field notes, 8 December 
2016)  
 
The tensions generated around risky calls were alleviated through the act of physically seeing 
the victims/callers. It provided reassurance to the FCR and frontline responders that the 
victim was safe at that particular point in time. Within a more risk-averse context it also 
demonstrated externally that the officers had attended the incident. The longer it took to 
respond to a risky call, the more tensions were generated: 
 
There had been a DA incident that had been reported at 8.00am that day [now approx. 
5.00pm] which still needed resourcing. The IP worked at a school and had stated that 
she didn’t want the police attending her home but would rather they come to her 
work. The Oscar seemed annoyed that they had not yet been able to see the IP and 
expressed annoyance at the IPs account of the incident and also her requirements … 
The IP, according to the Oscar, had said she would be free that day (but they hadn’t 
got to her) or they could come to her work tomorrow and she would ‘try to see them’. 
… He repeated that she ‘might’ be free. His concern was making sure they saw the IP. 
He said: ‘This is a domestic. We need to see her at the end of the day’. (Field notes, 1 
December 2016) 
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In the above examples there is a tension between the lack of available resources, the victim’s 
wishes, and the precautionary need to physically ‘see’ the victim as soon as possible to 
confirm that they are safe. The Oscar (supervisor) is involved as they are the only people 
authorised to schedule an appointment for a domestic related incident (i.e. downgrading it 
from a 2 to a 3). This is an example of what Heaton (2010) calls ‘scaled up’ (i.e. adding 
additional layers of management to the risk management process). Again we see riskwork 
engaged in to manage the pressure that emerges during this incident. The history of policing 
domestic incidents and the domestic response policy that has been implemented because of 
this history adds to the anxiety surrounding these risks. As Fischer and McGivern (2016) 
argue, new forms of risk management implemented after a crisis can heighten people’s 
affective response. We see here the attempts to minimise the unknown and incalculable 
effects of the future as a way of governing social problems within a risk dispositif (Aradau & 
Van Munster 2007).  
 
3. Professional decision-making and risk 
In addition to policies which manage risk to victims, staff also manage risk to the 
organization and themselves. The emerging precautionary risk dispositif imposes its own 
logic on those who engage with it within the FCR. Staff engage in particular forms of 
riskwork in order to manage or rationalise their professional decision-making in relation to 
the risk management policies, tools and technologies they interact with. These individual 
actors make sense of institutional scripts (Power 2016) via certain practices that reinforce the 
presence of risk within the FCR. Risks that the police are currently focusing on become risks 
through the ways in which they become ‘thinkable’ and through the ways in which staff 
attempt to manage them (Aradau & Van Munster 2017). One such way in the FCR is through 
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the use of ‘cautionary tales’. Officers and staff would describe a selection of critical incidents 
that either they or nearby forces had dealt with. These incidents had often resulted in 
investigations and/or forces being held to account for service failures. They acted as folk tales 
or urban legends within the FCR, being told and retold by staff who most likely had not had 
any involvement with the original incident. However, they also acted as cautionary scripts 
and reminders when similar incidents were called in, for example domestic abuse calls or 
dropped 999 calls. The researcher was told on several occasions about a select few incidents 
that had specific relevance to frontline responses, especially call handling and dispatch. 
Smith, Pedersen and Burnett (2014) note that police forces are storytelling organizations. 
Police use storytelling to make sense of situations and to establish culture. They also 
perpetuate the ‘social and political dimensions of police knowledge’ in that ‘stories pass on 
and replicate the organizational DNA’ (p. 232). In the FCR stories were used to foreground 
risk and to demonstrate an awareness of the need to be cautious. They ensured the continued 
and imagined presence of previous critical incidents, the lessons from which guided staff 
behaviours and actions within a risk-averse climate. These stories affected the individual 
working practices of FCR staff. 
 
Officers and staff also hinted at a ‘blame culture’ (Heaton 2010) within policing, in contrast 
to the national policy objective of improving confidence with regards to risk-taking: 
 
I asked the dispatchers about their views on the DA policy of grading all DA’s a 1 or 
2 Their view was that it is better to be cautious and have to downgrade at a later date 
than miss something at the initial call. They raised the notion of potential risk. They 
said that everyone will have an incident investigated at some point. They said that at 
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any one time someone will be under investigation but that people don’t tend to tell 
each other when it happens. They looked around the room as if to suggest that 
someone in there would be under investigation at that time. People don’t say to each 
other it is happening but it will be happening. So they discussed the need to be very 
careful with how you respond to an incident. They said you need to keep logs of the 
decisions you have made so that at any time you can go back and justify the decisions 
you have made. The logs support your account and can serve to back up your 
decisions at a later date if needs be. So they were favourable of being risk aware. 
They mentioned that there is always the chance that on that one occasion that you 
don’t keep an account something bad might happen. This notion of the ‘one’ bad 
outcome hangs over the dispatchers and contributes to their response. (Field notes, 22 
November 2016) 
 
As can be seen above, the fear of investigation for service failures individualises staff in an 
otherwise team-working environment. It also adds to a culture of fear within the FCR of not 
knowing where and in what situations people are being held accountable for their actions. 
One way in which staff manage this unknown is through the detailed and cautious keeping of 
logs which account for their decision-making. This was referred to as ‘arse covering’ and 
operated as a defence mechanism against the tensions of a risk aversion occupational culture:    
 
The intelligence officer talked about ‘rationalising’ all decisions made… All 
decisions needed to be recorded, including why you would or would not respond to an 
incident in a particular way. She called it ‘arse covering’. She described the need to 
keep records of everything in case something happened and you need to account for 
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your decisions. She said ‘if you don’t write it down, it hasn’t happened’. Even if you 
have acted, if it isn’t written down it hasn’t happened. She said that if something 
happens to a victim ‘all they want to know is, who was the last person to deal with it?’ 
The ‘they’ in this scenario being some form of police investigators. The implication 
being that if you are the last point of contact in a case then the responsibility falls to 
you. (Field notes, 24 November 2016) 
 
Discussion and conclusion: precautionary policing 
This article has highlighted how risks are governed within a precautionary (policing) risk 
dispositif. In this FCR, staff and officers maintained a risk averse approach in 
contradistinction to policy efforts and discourses which support a balanced approach to risk 
taking. In practice, the risk artefacts that have been designed using knowledge and expertise 
are contradicted by rigid policies and practices that are implemented to avoid any risk. This 
zero tolerance for risk also highlights the issue of resources being ‘diverted into unattainable 
attempts to eliminate the possibility of “high-profile” failures’ (Heaton, Bryant & Tong 2018, 
p. 2; see also Heaton 2010). Thus we begin to see a shift in policing to precautionary 
approaches which do not necessarily follow the intended blueprints of risk management. 
Ransley and Mazerolle (2009) identify this uncertainty as the ‘hallmark of the new era of 
policing’ (p. 368), ushered in because of challenges to legitimacy from a wider audience and 
an expanded police remit including new security and social policy responsibilities. In the 
context of uncertainty, inaction is indefensible, even when the potential threat or consequence 
is unknown (Campbell 2004). However, this precautionary approach is continually 
(re)negotiated in relation to an austerity environment in which resourcing incidents is a 
challenge.  
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The policies and responses discussed above are demonstrative of this fear of inaction. In 
contrast to this, officers and staff ensure they engage in action, including prioritising 
physically seeing victims and callers in relation to specific offence types. This, as we have 
seen, often threatened and eroded opportunities for police discretion. As Heaton, Bryant and 
Tong (2018) observe, while scientific techniques of risk management are important for 
informing decision-making, the ‘fast and frugal’ forms of risk assessment required by officers 
and staff are still crucial to informing police practices (p. 6). Therefore, inflexible policies 
intended to design out risk may actually serve to hinder context-specific risk assessment. 
Tools like the domestic abuse risk assessment (DASH) have been implemented to improve 
the police response to victims of domestic abuse; something which has historically not been 
seen as ‘police work’. However, the graded response policy may work against these intended 
benefits in a precautionary dispositif. A study by Ballucci et al. (2017) highlighted that 
domestic abuse risk assessment tools were seen as either an alternative or a challenge to 
police discretion and expertise, rather than as the collection of expert police knowledge (cf. 
Ericson & Haggerty 1997). This article highlighted the tensions that arose for officers 
utilising risk assessments that are implemented to assist officers’ decision-making and which 
can result in resistance rather than incorporation.	As Fischer and McGivern (2016) argue, risk 
management tools which are designed to ‘cool problems’ may instead ‘heat up’ feelings of 
fear and blame within the risk management setting. 
 
In Policing the Risk Society Ericson and Haggerty (1997) discuss a move away from 
excessive paper work and narrative accounts of policing to risk tools, technologies and 
proforma which require limited information in the move to efficient risk management 
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knowledge gathering. Campbell (2004), however, suggests that in contrast to Ericson and 
Haggerty’s ‘end of narrative’ account, police officers engage in keeping narrative accounts of 
their actions, justifying their practices, and the decisions they make. This contradicts the 
notion of the ‘police as risk experts’ and, as Campbell demonstrates, highlights the actuality 
of risk management. Keeping narrative accounts as an additional and individual practice is 
representative of the ‘struggle to expertise in neoliberal societies’ (Campbell 2004, p. 710). 
As we can see in the examples above, keeping logs and narratives of decision-making is a 
form of precautionary policing and a defence mechanism in which staff are anticipating 
potential future problems and uncertainties. Here, narrative acts as a form of precaution 
against unintended consequences. However, rather than providing feelings of security, these 
narratives drive and maintain the presence of risk aversion; sharing cautionary tales and 
preparing to be held accountable at some unknown but potential future point. At an individual 
level, the riskwork engaged in in a precautionary risk dispositif carries an affective dimension 
generated in the interaction between risk tools and technologies and those who interact with 
them. 
 
In this article we have provided the first application of Foucault’s le dispositif to understand 
and conceptualise the riskwork that is performed within policing, specifically focusing on the 
police force control room and response. We conceptualise ‘precautionary policing’ as a 
dispositif which attempts to govern what appears to be ungovernable. By conceptualising the 
police response to crime through a precautionary dispositif, we can unravel the relational 
influence between national and local policy and discourses, risk tools, artefacts and 
technologies, external public and political pressures, and the practice of individual subjects at 
this historically situated moment (Foucault 1980). It allows us to understand the actualities of 
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how risk is being managed and the additional work that goes in to this as opposed to the 
assumed rational and cool logic of risk management practices. Moreover, we can begin to 
understand the relationship between individuals and the police organization through the 
everyday practices that they engage in within the requirement to effectively manage 
resources in line with risk whilst being complicit with policies that do not allow for it. This 
generates affective tensions and concerns and goes some way to explaining the difficulty in 
reducing the culture of risk aversion that continues to permeate the policing environment and 
the resistance this engenders. Further empirical studies of police cultures and police 
organizational practices including international comparisons and case studies using this 
analytical tool would assist us to broaden out the relational categories that influence and 
dispose the police organization and its subjects to precautionary policing. 
 
Further studies would also be useful to allow us to discern how different forces’ risk practices 
are shaped by differing critical incidents and cautionary tales that have guided their local risk 
policies. Whilst it is likely that there will be similarities, for example with domestic abuse, 
there may also be force specific incidents that have resulted in force specific risk 
management practices which have created other forms of affective response. It should be 
noted that some of the resistance we saw in this study to domestic abuse incidents are likely 
to be informed by existing police culture that may place less value on responding to these 
incidents. Further work in this area is needed to ascertain how policies in relation to 
responding to reports of domestic abuse received by the organization, may work against one 
another as they are viewed by particular actors or groups as threatening or resisting 
traditional tenets of police culture. Reviews of domestic abuse risk assessment tools have 
already shown that whilst they can be hugely beneficial for victims, they can also misalign 
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with the realities of frontline policing which in practice are emotional, time-bound and 
pressurised (Robinson et al. 2016). In addition to a precautionary policing and ‘one-size fits 
all’ policies, this pressure appears to be greatly increased, particularly in the current post-
austerity policing landscape. 
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Notes 
																																																						
1 A young child who was killed by her guardians. This incident led to major reform in child 
protective services. 
2 The murder of two school girls by a school staff member which led to the introduction of 
detailed criminal records checks for all persons working with children.  
3 999 is the telephone number for contacting the emergency services (police, fire service and 
ambulance) in England. The non-emergency telephone number for the police is 101. 
